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Epigenetics is regarded by many as a compelling domain of biomedicine. The purported novelty 
of epigenetics has begun to have various societal ramifications, particularly in relation to 
processes of responsiblisation. Within sociology, it has stimulated hopeful debate about 
conceptual rapprochements between the biomedical and social sciences. This article is concerned 
with how novelty is socially produced and negotiated. The paper engages directly with scientists’ 
talk and writings about epigenetics (as process and field of study). I aim to advance an explicitly 
sociological analysis about the novelty of epigenetics that underscores its social production rather 
than an account which participates in its reification. I attend to definitional skirmishes, 
comparisons with genetics, excitement and intrigue, and considerations of the ethical dimensions 
of epigenetics. Any assertions that epigenetics is exciting or important should not inadvertently 
elide reflexive consideration of how such characterisations might be part of the machinery by 
which they become real.  
 




Epigenetic research is increasingly presented as a compelling domain of biomedicine, even if 
characterising it is not straightforward. Commonly, though, it is regarded as a field of study 
concerned with heritable changes to gene expression that do not change the DNA sequence 
itself. Epigenetics is also an emotional accelerant, with excitement about its implications for 
biology and medicine readily apparent within biomedical literatures (e.g. Allis and Jenuwein, 
2016: 487; Rodríguez-Paredes and Esteller, 2011: 330). Enthusiasm is also evident in sociological 
scholarship; in this journal, for instance, Meloni (2013: 732) has argued that epigenetics can help 
to constitute “a more pluralistic and contingent vision of ‘the biological’” (ibid: 742). Rather than 
the banal “importing of biological knowledge into the social” (ibid), such a vision is judged as 
having the potential to facilitate more fruitful interactions between biologists and sociologists. 
Elsewhere, the centrality of ‘the environment’ to epigenetics has been implied to underscore the 
import of sociology and the expertise of sociologists. For example, Rose (2013: 18) has described 
how “at its best, the turn to epigenetics marks a recognition of the inseparability of vitality and 
milieu which could give a crucial role for the social and human sciences in accounting for the 
shaping of vitality at the molecular level.” Sociological hopes for epigenetics, then, are often 
high.  
 
This article engages with scientists’ talk and writings about epigenetics (as process and field). It 
aims to advance a sociological analysis about the novelty of epigenetics that underscores its social 
production. In what follows, I describe the backdrop to my arguments, outline the study from 
which my data emerged, and document some of the different ways through which the novel is 
synthesized and negotiated within scientific discourse. These include through definitional debate, 
comparisons with genetics, and considerations of the ethical dimensions of epigenetics. I seek to 
add to sociological deliberations about ostensibly innovative entities and practices through 
underscoring that newness should not be considered only as a pivot for analysis, but that this is 
also an important problematic in itself. I thus elucidate epigenetics as a test-case in the sociology 
of novelty. 
 
Social Science, Epigenetics, and the Negotiation of Novelty  
 
Interest from humanities and social science scholars in theorising about and with epigenetic 
knowledge and processes has been growing in recent years (e.g. Meloni, 2014; Papadopoulos, 
2011; Rose, 2013). Some take the development of research in epigenetics to represent “a new 
opportunity for dialogue” between social and life scientists (Meloni, 2014: 731). The potential for 
this relates to how ‘the environment’ has been perceived to be of enhanced significance within 
biomedicine, as a diversely factorialised progenitor for epigenetic changes that can have 
phenotypic effects (Landecker, 2011). This has proved compelling to both biomedical and social 
scientists who are concerned with how substances and processes beyond the boundary of the 
body might exert bodily effects through epigenetic action (Meloni and Testa, 2014: 431). For 
Nicolosi and Ruivenkamp (2012: 318), epigenetics “could be a new paradigm” with the potential 
to “support humanities [scholars] and social scientists in their analyses and interventions”. In 
sum, a range of analysts have considered epigenetics as a potentially novel and important field 
that could ‘revitalise’ (Fitzgerald et al, 2016) sociology and social theory.  
 
Other work has focussed more on how epigenetics circulates within (Robison, 2016; Stelmach 
and Nerlich, 2015; Waggoner and Uller, 2015) - and, to an extent, impacts (Niewöhner et al, 
2011; Pickersgill, 2018; Warin et al, 2020) - societies. Here, reproductive science and maternal 
health have formed a significant focus. In particular, analysts have shown how epigenetics can 
(or could) be leveraged to create enhanced responsibilities on women during pregnancy (e.g., 
Pentecost, 2018; Richardson, 2015; Valdez, 2018). Biomedical research on rodents is a key 
surface of emergence for a logic of epigenetic responsibility. Within this, “commonsense 
assumptions” regarding sex and gender are constitutive of research that “illustrate[s] rather than 
interrogate[s] existing stereotypes about maternal agency and responsibility” (Kenney and Müller, 
2017: 23). As epigenetic knowledge moves beyond the laboratory, it can participate in 
“producing new versions of vulnerable, plastic life that require protection now” – including prior 
to conception (Mansfield, 2017: 355). Although “the pre-pregnancy care literature predated the 
emergence of epigenetics as a popular scientific topic” (Waggoner, 2017: 20), epigenetic ideas 
seem increasingly folded into constructions of women as responsible for foetuses not yet even 
conceived. When epigenetics collides with maternal health, the purported novelty of epigenetics 
often supports processes of responsibilisation and individualisation.   
 
Sociologists and anthropologists have also considered the social dimensions of epigenetic 
research itself. For example, analyses of scientific discourse, interviews with scientists, and 
ethnographies of laboratories have cast new light on the material-semiotic practices constituting 
epigenetics (e.g. Lappé, 2018; Lloyd and Raikhel, 2018; Niewöhner, 2015). Different areas of 
epigenetic research can inspire distinct biopolitical visions of the future; hence, the implications 
projected by scientists about their work are not epiphenomena of epigenetics writ large but relate 
to how epigenetics is enfolded within particular biomedical traditions (Müller and Samaras, 
2018). For instance, Rapp’s (2011) ethnographic work on scientists studying the “epigenetic 
effects of social stress and paternal age on children’s mental disorders” (ibid: 668) shows how the 
idiom of epigenetics fosters a rich(er) imaginary of ‘the environment’, enjoining the “appreciation 
of complexity and nondeterminism” in psychiatric aetiology (ibid: 669). It is precisely this 
broadening of biologists’ conceptions of ‘the environment’ and ‘the social’ that have proven so 
compelling to some social scientists (Niewöhner and Lock, 2018). Elsewhere, though, analysts 
have been more concerned about how epigenetics can co-exist with and might augment 
longstanding forms of biological reductionism and determinism (Saldaña-Tejeda and Wade, 
2019). 
 
The Sociology of Novelty 
 
Be they optimistic or critical, commentaries on epigenetics – including some from social 
scientists – are commonly premised on a perception that the field represents something 
particularly new and important, stimulating excitement or concern. Yet, biologists themselves 
can sometimes be reticent to ascribe novelty to epigenetics (e.g. Niewöhner, 2011). Tolwinski’s 
(2013) study is notable for its attention to how scientists judge the import of epigenetics. She 
details a spectrum of opinion, which “suggests a far more complex and contested trajectory” for 
epigenetics research than is often considered in external appraisals (Tolwinski, 2013: 366; see 
relatedly Pickersgill, 2016). Accordingly, the epistemic novelty of epigenetics cannot be taken for 
granted; rather, it is discursively negotiated. 
 
As Webster (2002, 2005) has indicated, the presentation of objects as ‘old’ or ‘new’ depends in 
part on what work different social actors seek to achieve through various kinds of positioning. In 
other words, novelty is not only in the eye of the beholder, but its characterisation is also 
dependent on where others have placed the entity or practice under appraisal. Hence, not 
everyone will everywhere and always judge it as novel. If the nature of ‘the novel’ is contestable, 
then a sociology of novelty is possible (Pickersgill, 2019). My approach takes as its starting point 
the premise that novelty is not a fixed property of an object, theory, or form of social action: it 
is, instead, an achievement worthy of study. The analytic gambit advanced in this paper is 
influenced by the sociology of scientific knowledge (Barnes, 1983). Consequently, I engage with 
more materialist histories and sociologies of science that focus on the emergence of 
technoscientific praxis (e.g. Rheinberger, 1997) while nevertheless having a somewhat different 
contribution in mind.   
 
My contention in relation to novelty, though, is not a radical (or perhaps ‘novel’) proposition. 
Sociologists are largely comfortable with the notion that scientific endeavour (Longino, 1990) 
and the constitution of knowledge (Bloor, 1991 [1976]) are social accomplishments operative 
within particular epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999), familiar with the idea that framing 
technoscientific developments as compelling can contribute to sociotechnical change (Fujimura, 
1988), and accepting of the proposition that ontologies are negotiated rather than pre-given 
(Law, 1999; Mol, 1999). It should not be controversial to regard characterisations of the 
processes and products of science as mutable rather than quintessential, including when those 
characterisations are of originality and import (cf. Arribas-Ayllon et al, 2010, on ‘complexity’). 
Work on the sociology of expectations about innovation comes close to this, through analysis of 
the promissory discourse that attributions of novelty can inspire (Borup et al, 2006; Hedgecoe 
and Martin, 2003). Still, sociological attention rarely fixes specifically upon discourses and 
negotiations of novelty. I argue that centring the novel within sociology can contribute to our 
understandings of the dynamics of contemporary technoscientific praxis, and potentially further 




This article draws from a qualitative project entitled ‘Epigenetics, Ethics and Society: Accounting 
for Responsibility in the Biomedical Sciences’, funded by the Wellcome Trust. This involved 
three intersecting approaches. Specifically, I: conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with 
senior (personal or endowed chairs) UK-based scientists undertaking leading work on (or on 
issues closely related to) epigenetics; undertook informal conversations with biologists in the US, 
UK, and Canada (including postdoctoral researches, mid-career scientists, and long-established 
professors); and, examined scientific texts around epigenetics (particularly editorials, 
commentaries, and review articles).  
 
My work was motivated by two concerns. First, I was intrigued as to how practitioners of an area 
of science that has been regarded by so many as exciting and important judged it themselves. 
Hence, my sociological interest in epigenetics was focussed on the enthusiasm it enjoined, not 
the science itself. Second, I wanted to explore how scientists working in a field regarded as 
having ramifications for healthcare and beyond delineated the implications of their work, and 
their responsibilities to wider society.  
 
This paper developed primarily from the interviews. I specifically sought out scientists who 
might be considered opinion-leaders, drawing up a list of potential interviewees based on 
markers of prestige such as significant grants from major funders, presence on relevant editorial 
boards, and highly-cited articles. I was interested in how scientists who could reasonably be 
regarded as influential players in the field of epigenetics sought to present, describe, and inform 
it. The interviews ranged across definitional aspects of epigenetics, its normative implications, 
and public and policy interactions.  
 
Following informed consent, interviews were recorded and later professionally transcribed.1 The 
interview data then re-orientated my targeted engagement with the scientific literature on 
epigenetics, and served as vignettes for further conversations with biomedical researchers - 
shaping my analysis of the interviews. This was itself broadly abductive (Timmermans and 
Tavory, 2014), with data aggregated into broad themes (e.g. ‘therapies’, ‘public engagement, and 
‘policy interactions’), that facilitated its closer interrogation in dialogue with wider sociological 
(and anthropological) literatures.  
 
While this article emerged as a consequence of the analysis as described, it is also informed both 
by my informal conversations with scientists and by my attention to the biomedical literature. In 
the former case, I spoke to a range of faculty (postdoctoral researchers, lecturers, and professors) 
across several universities in three countries. These were a mix of serendipitous conversations by 
people finding their way into epigenetics research, chats over coffee with scientists arranged in 
part to discuss their research and my interests in epigenetics and society, and specific meetings 
where the aim was explicitly to seek wider opinion from internationally-regarded experts during 
which I made notes. In the latter case, I consulted opinion pieces and research papers written by 
my respondents, other key papers that garnered attention (including but not limited to citations), 
and editorials and review articles in key journals. I also undertook targeting literature searches to 
further explore themes that had emerged in the talk or texts of my interlocutors.  
 
My analysis will inevitably have been inflected by my ongoing position as a sociologist with 
research management responsibilities in a large medical school. Many of my everyday 
professional activities constitute a form of fieldwork that is revealing of how knowledge 
production and adjudication occur within biomedical milieus, shaping how I read and respond to 
interview data with scientists. While it is challenging to narrate how, exactly, this ongoing 
interaction with biomedical scientists in professional and personal life has shaped my work, it 




As noted above, although epigenetics is commonly defined as heritable changes to gene 
expression which do not go on to change the DNA sequence itself, more precise meanings 
remain contested (Landecker and Panofsky, 2013; Meloni and Testa, 2014; Pickersgill, 2016). I 
want to dwell on this point: partly, because of its centrality to scientific discourse around 
epigenetics; also, though, because I suggest that strategies to bound epigenetics through the on-
going articulation of definitions perform ‘novelty work’. Specifically, they reflect and participate 
in propelling an understanding of the field as new and significant. In what follows, I am less 
concerned with the particularities of those definitions, so much as with the fact of their diversity. 
 
Characterisations of epigenetics are located between axes of capaciousness and restriction. Some 
allow for a range of processes and fields to be categorised as epigenetic(s); for instance, 
emphasising processes and mechanisms that are not necessarily heritable, such as transient 
histone modification (Bird, 2007). Others, though, involve more careful boundary work (cf. 
Gieryn, 1983) in order to advance stricter demarcations of the field that often privilege 
heritability (Deans and Maggert, 2015). My interviews reflected this debate, as indicated by two 
quotes below regarding the role of chromatin (i.e., a ‘package’ of DNA, RNA, and protein) 
within epigenetics. R5, for example, drew comparisons between himself and other scientists, and 
advocated a certain ontological openness:  
 
[P]eople get grumpy sometimes when you go to chromatin meetings and lots of people in the chromatin 
world now will start talking about epigenetics and their research will be badged as epigenetic. Well, I have 
no problem with that. I think that’s fine. 
 
R6, however, took a harder line on who could lay claim to be working in epigenetics: 
 
[S]ome people call themselves an epigeneticist because they work on modified DNA and modified 
chromatin. That’s nonsense. What they’re working on is modification. They’re not working in epigenetics. 
 
Within the bioscientific literature, researchers have problematized the definitional heterogeneity 
of epigenetics (see Bird, 2007; Heard and Martienssen, 2014; Holliday, 2006; Isles, 2015). Some 
have sought to domesticate diversity (e.g., Deans and Maggert, 2015; Greally, 2018), such as by 
amalgamating different characterisations and parsing important common features. Rather than 
constituting the unanimity many commentators urge, this has multiplied the definitions available. 
Each one in turn contributes to the notion that epigenetics is sufficiently new and important to 
necessitate such debate. 
 
While the scientific “problems” relating “to these definitional ambiguities” (Deans and Maggert, 
2015: 887) might be regularly lamented, a further corollary is that locating the implications of 
epigenetics for health and society can be challenging. This seems not to have limited bioethical 
research on epigenetics (Huang and King, 2018). Nevertheless, it is at least potentially an issue 
for scientists when asked to comment on the ethical dimensions of epigenetics: 
 
[I]f you want to discuss about the implication of something you have first to define the boundary of this 
something. And today, this boundary is exploding, we have absolutely no idea what epigenetic[s] means 
today. (R3) 
 
In practice, however, scientists continue their research, and flexibly characterise work as 
epigenetics (or not) in bids, presentations, and articles (cf. Barnes and Dupré, 2008; Fox Keller, 
2000; Rheinberger, 2010). Indeed, immediately after making the remarks above, R3 stated: 
“probably the best definition is something that modifies expression of genes, not based on the 
change in DNA”. Through their comments, R3 illustrated how feasible it is for scientists to 
speak across different registers when discussing epigenetics. Specifically, they deployed a kind of 
contingent repertoire to underscore the uncertainties around what epigenetics really is, while 
participating in a more empiricist repertoire that stabilised the nature of epigenetics for the 
purposes of undertaking and discussing research (cf. Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). By shifting 
between registers, scientists are able to develop studies in epigenetics while also reflecting on 
terminological instability.  
 
Epigenetics is thus, to an extent, in flux: both what this research field properly comprises, and 
what epigenetic mechanisms are, remain open to debate. That frequent attempts are made to 
close this down is a reminder of what is at stake for those who succeed in taming contestation to 
accord with their own position. One key dividend is the possibility of enhancing some research 
agendas over alternatives, and perhaps attracting capital to certain projects while restricting its 
availability for others (Calvert, 2006; Schyfter and Calvert, 2015). 
 
Consequently, practices of promoting, defending, and attacking different conceptions of 
epigenetics do not necessarily reflect the fact that it is an inherently important and novel field, 
the boundaries of which require demarcation and fortification for its nurturance. Rather, we can 
read the proliferation of definitions as one means by which this novelty itself comes to be 
produced and propelled. The processes of problematisation through which the ontology of 
epigenetics is reflexively unsettled and carefully rebuilt present the field as worthy of such 
epistemic (as well as economic and emotional) investment. Hence, debate around demarcation 
within epigenetics discourse contributes to presenting the field as holding a wider significance 
than biomedical traditions within which “definitional ambiguities” (Deans and Maggert, 2015: 
887) and skirmishes are less routinely staged or publicly visible (even while they continue to exist, 
as in genetics; Barnes and Dupré, 2008; Fox Keller, 2000; Rheinberger, 2010).  
 
Genetics and Epigenetics 
 
The presentation of newly consolidating biomedical realms as pioneering and innovative is one 
means by which expectations are generated, scientific (and wider) intrigue fostered, and capital 
attracted (Calvert and Fujimura, 2009; Hilgartner, 2015). In epigenetics, journal research articles, 
commentaries, and editorials co-construct the novelty of the field through, for instance, 
accentuating how epigenetic processes add another layer of complexity to understandings of 
genetics. A common trope in this regard is to foreground the definitional salience of the Greek 
prefix epi-, where the root of this as (e.g.) ‘upon or ‘over’ is emphasised. An indicative editorial in 
the journal Nature simultaneously acknowledged the import of genetics while asserting the need 
for new studies into epigenetics: 
 
It is hard to think of any branch of human biology that has not benefited from the human genome 
sequence […] But despite the progress, each question that the genome helps to answer throws up 
further questions. Much remains to be understood about how genetic information is interpreted by the 
individual cells in our body. This is where epigenetics comes in. Upon the genome, on the genome, 
over the genome — take your pick — epigenetics collectively describes changes in the regulation of gene 
expression that can be passed on to a cell’s progeny but are not due to changes to the nucleotide sequence 
of the gene. (Anonymous, 2015: 273; paragraph breaks removed, emphasis added) 
 
By noting that epigenetics focusses on an additional layer of complexity, it can thus be framed as 
redressing the limitations of genetics: ie., epigenetics can answer questions that genetics cannot. 
This framing occurred in some of my interviews and wider conversations with scientists; for 
example, R4 phrased the shortcomings of genetic science in terms of the somatic uncertainties 
that persisted even after much attention to “the genetic components” of diseases: 
 
I hope, and I don’t know whether that’s going to pan out, that a lot of the common adult diseases in 
humans, you know, in which the genetic components are better defined now, but a lot of the causation is 
missing, so to speak, taking all the genetic factors into account, that the important epigenetic components 
could be identified and ultimately therefore converted into new treatment ideas  
 
A similar temporo-epistemic hierarchy (i.e., ‘first genetics, then epigenetics’) was presented by 
R3: 
 
[T]he way the environment act[s] on gene is through epigenetics, so if you want to analyse, to really analyse 
the effect of the environment, you have to develop some epigenetic studies and to think about the 
consequence of what you will find. Because today, er it’s interesting because er genetics used to be Mendel 
and his peas. And then in the last 30 years, everything has become genetics. And I think, er and we see the 
limitation of that, and I think that in the next 20 years, everything will be epigenetics2 
 
This hierarchy was not universal, however. Some scientists I spoke to were hostile towards the 
epistemic ostentatiousness of a discourse that presented genetics as yesterday’s news (Pickersgill, 
2016). Further, review articles (e.g. on cancer and epigenetics) often intertwine talk of genes and 
genetics with discussion of epigenetic processes. Such articles reinforce the mutual significance 
of genetics and epigenetics for the discovery of new drugs (e.g. Feinberg et al, 2016; Jones et al, 
2016; Plass et al, 2013). In one, published in Nature Reviews Genetics, Plass and colleagues (2013: 
765) argued that “high-resolution genome-sequencing efforts have discovered a wealth of 
mutations in genes encoding epigenetic regulators that have roles as 'writers', 'readers' or 'editors' 
of DNA methylation and/or chromatin states”. Such mutations “have the potential to deregulate 
hundreds of targeted genes genome wide”. Ultimately, a better understanding of these processes 
will “inform novel therapeutic strategies”. We can see, then, that genetic science and 
technologies are conceived of as essential for comprehending how epigenetic effects might be 
exerted in the first place, and to what ends. Notwithstanding this, the salient novelty in articles 
like those by Plass et al lies in epigenetic processes and the possibilities that exist for innovations 
which might modify them.  
 
To summarise, the novelty of epigenetics is, in part, constituted both through texts and talk 
explicitly concerned with epigenetic process which present genetic work as having limits that 
research in epigenetics can transcend (see relatedly Arribas-Ayllon et al, 2010). It is also 
generated through writings aimed at readers such as scientists working in oncology, wherein 
epigenetics is introduced as a means of indicating thrilling new possibilities and hence 
configuring the field of epigenetics as exciting and new in itself by virtue of that which it enables.  
 
Excitement and Innovation 
 
Whatever epigenetics is, it is certainly “a fashionable subject” (Deichmann, 2016: 249). All the 
scientists I spoke with were well aware of this modishness. Prior to agreeing to an interview, one 
quizzed me over email over what I thought epigenetics was. I assumed that this “test” sought to 
assess the acceptability of my motivations for requesting an interview: was I merely jumping on 
the latest bandwagon?3 Some researchers I interviewed were positive about what they described 
as the expansion of epigenetics. R4, for instance, was “very excited about the science”. They 
went on to say: 
  
I think we are still at the stage where it’s [epigenetics] expanding quite a lot. I think we’re now in a much 
better position in terms of understanding, truly understanding the mechanisms. I think we’re beginning to 
develop towards where more specific intervention is possible. That’s very exciting, I think for medicine. 
And we’re seeing this enormous spread of epigenetic knowledge into other areas of biomedicine  
 
Other scientists (both my interlocutors and journal commentators) painted a more modest 
picture of the rise of epigenetics. Still, its enhanced prominence within biomedicine has been 
often discussed and/or advocated through, for instance, scientific review articles (e.g. Feinberg, 
2018; Heyn and Esteller, 2012; Dawson and Kouzarides, 2012; Millan, 2013). This textual form 
is particularly important for field-construction and conveying scientific promise (Arribas-Ayllon 
et al, 2010; Myers, 1991; Hedgecoe, 2006). In our conversation, R7 described the rise of interest 
in epigenetics in their own area of specialism: “when you go to cancer or ageing meetings now, 
there’ll probably be an epigenetic session. Whereas 10 years ago that wouldn’t have been the 
case.” As they put it: “almost without noticing it I guess epigenetics of cancer is now really, really 
hot” (cf. Fujimura, 1988).  
 
For one interviewee (R5) who spoke largely about histone modification, research in epigenetics 
was “so exciting for medics” and “the general public” because it emphasised the environment: 
 
[Epigenetics] appeals to, I hope will start to appeal to the general public, although we’ve got some work to 
do there because it gives a mechanism for how your, as I say, your diet, your lifestyle, you know, all the rest 
of it can feed into your, into your genome and, you know, we’re beginning to understand how these things 
can have a very profound effect on the way your body works.4 
 
Some of my respondents presented epigenetics as potentially holding implications for future 
health, and the catalysis of innovation. This promissory aspect was especially apparent vis-à-vis 
cancer, and in the preponderance of writings highlighting drug-discovery targets for therapies 
acting upon epigenetic mechanisms (e.g., Dawson and Kouzarides, 2012; Garraway and Jones et 
al, 2016; Lander, 2013). R3, for instance, suggested that epigenetic effects could be used as a 
biomarker for carcinogenic pollutants: 
 
[C]hemicals can modify your epigenetic, the signature epigenetic of your genes. So, why I say that is 
because there’s some question about pollution, and er the effect[s] of a lot of pollutant[s] which we know 
have some effect[s], different kind of effect[s] on cancer and how they can also modulate, er the ways a 
gene function[s] through some epigenetic change. So I think that in this regard it’s quite, epigenetic[s] can 
be a way to analyse the effect of the change of the environment, and the danger of the environment.  
 
R5 felt that innovation was already happening: 
 
[T]he medics obviously have come in, you know, very, sort of, willingly and rapidly, because both the 
enzymes and the binding proteins offer an array [of] potential drug targets. And these are now being used 
and some are finding their way [into the] clinic. So it’s something that appeals to pharmaceutical 
companies, ‘cause of drug development, it appeals to the medics, ‘cause it is generating new therapies. I 
mean it’s always slow, but it’s starting to feed through.   
 
Despite R5’s optimism, other respondents expressed various kinds of unease about the notion 
that epigenetic research held straightforward implications for healthcare and society. In relation 
to oncology, R6 argued that although cancer was an area of drug discovery regarding epigenetics, 
the direction of current therapeutic innovation pathways might be flawed. R8 reflected critically 
on what they saw as erroneous perspectives about biopsychosocial causality, and hence the limits 
of epigenetics: 
 
[T]here’s a lot of stuff now about maternal diet and how that influences your foetus. You know it probably 
does influence your foetus because your foetus is growing in your body, if you’re a mother, but the idea that 
it’s writing long term information on your DNA, er I think is a little bit insidious. It sort of gives this erm 
kind of slightly sinister er message. So, out there, there’s quite a lot of interest in the idea of epigenetics, I 
think, you know, in psychiatry and things like that, people love the idea that there’s a kind of molecular 
mechanism underlying a lot of the things they see. But it’s not clear to me it’s true. 
 
Accordingly, some biologists I spoke with were circumspect about the innovative potential of 
epigenetics, the claims made about the science, and the expectations with which it is associated. 
Even R4, who as noted earlier spoke of excitement about epigenetic research, also asserted: “we 
have to be very cautious as scientists to portray the science appropriately, both in terms of the 
excitement and the promise, but also in terms of the limits of knowledge.” 
 
Excitement about and interest in epigenetics was thus something that my respondents either 
expressed directly or ascribed in others. While emotive responses like excitement are key features 
of scientific praxis (Fortun, 2015; White, 2009), they are not inevitable. In the case of epigenetics, 
the purported novelty of knowledge produced in the field may go some way to explaining the 
excitement associated with it. This is not least because university science is a profession that is in 
large part organised around a trope that the new should generally (if not always) inspire 
enthusiasm (Fujimura, 1988). At the same time, the data above demonstrate how the purported 
novelty of epigenetics can also propel unease and dissatisfaction by scientists who resist 
characterisations of epigenetics as representative of epistemic innovation.  
 
Ethics and Novelty  
 
One discursive site for the generation of excitement and expectations around purportedly novel 
technoscience is the bioethics literature (Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003). Exhilaration and 
anticipation are clear within the first sentence of the abstract for one early commentary: 
“epigenetics is one of the most scientifically important, and legally and ethically significant, 
cutting-edge subjects of scientific discovery” (Rothstein et al, 2009: 1). Foreshadowing a 
burgeoning bioethical literature (reviewed by Huang and King, 2018), Rothstein and colleagues 
framed epigenetics as significant for issues such as environmental justice and intergenerational 
equity. In this section, I consider how scientists themselves construct the ethical dimensions and 
implications of epigenetics.  
 
Importantly, my respondents did not generally conclude that there were immediate ethical 
ramifications distinct to epigenetics. As R8 put it: “In a way genetics raises more ethical problems 
than epigenetics ever could.” When asked about the ethics of epigenetics as compared to genetics, 
R5 noted: “I can’t think of anything offhand that you could badge as epigenetics that is going to, 
that is, would generate concern”. Hence, we can see that the (ethical) novelty of epigenetics is not 
only assembled through talk and texts - it can be deconstructed as well. This underscores the 
negotiability of ‘the novel’.  
 
When prompted, my interviewees eventually advanced some form of reflection on the 
implications of epigenetics. However, I sometimes experienced this as a little grudging. 
Consequently, in what follows I treat my respondents’ talk not as clear examples of what they 
‘truly’ believe are the implications of epigenetics, but instead as further occasions through which 
novelty is negotiated. When the scientists I spoke with did articulate the ethical and social 
dimensions of their work, they leveraged established scientific and bioethical tropes. I will 
illustrate this through sizable extracts from two interviews where the ethical implications of 
epigenetics emerged, before then indicating how these ramifications related to pre-existing 
discourses. First, R7, who after initially noting that their research did not raise any particular 
ethical issues then went on to say: 
 
[O]ne of the goals […] is to be able to figure out people’s biological age from their epigenome. And I guess 
that does have big ethical implications, because […] if it were possible to do that through a blood test for 
example, then you’ve got insurance companies wanting to […] figure out people’s biological age and their 
predisposition to disease from their epigenome, which obviously does have big ethical implications. […] I 
don’t tend to think about it. None of the information we’re generating - you know, to me it will all be 
anonymised. None of it would be fed back to the [research participants]. In terms of the broader 
implications of figuring out this stuff […] I believe that […] knowledge should always be good provided 
it’s used in the right way. I guess we do have to decide how it’s gonna be used. I suppose I should probably 
be part of that debate. 
 
R2 also spoke about the issues of insurance and risk prediction:  
 
[I]f you can take a blood sample and that tells you about your risk of cancer, the same way […] BRCA 
[gene] testing has just now, that’s self-evident. But there’s another spin to it I think with epigenetics that 
goes beyond that, which is […] I talked about the example earlier of [how] we can distinguish by looking in 
at methylation and blood, between smokers and non-smokers but we can also distinguish between former 
smokers and current smokers or non-smokers, never smokers, and that again has implications […] 
Obvious implications in terms of insurance but has other implications in terms of monitoring that kind of 




I think the analogy with us mainly is […] with the gene testing that’s been happening with say BRCA, as an 
example […], and just now one can be in a situation where because of work that’s on-going you discover 
that somebody is a BRCA carrier and I think […] ethical advice around that has been very helpful in that 
field. And I think the same things could arise in the epigenetics area in a very analogous manner where […] 
markers of risk or environmental exposure that we talked about get identified and then there is going to be 
an issue there about genetic counselling or epigenetic counselling! That’s going to have to be looked at 
where, advice from ethics would be absolutely essential. 
 
In flagging risk prediction, R7 and R2 mirrored wider epigenetics discourse, wherein the notion 
of risk has traction. For instance, the authors of one review article in Heredity argued: 
“epigenetics holds substantial potential for furthering our understanding of the molecular 
mechanisms of environmental toxicants, as well as for predicting health-related risks due to 
conditions of environmental exposure and individual susceptibility” (Bollati and Baccarelli, 2010: 
105). The possibilities and perils of calculating genetic risk have circulated widely within the 
bioscientific, social scientific, bioethical, and policy literatures for many years now (Hallowell, 
1999; Novas and Rose, 2000). In this respect, the comments of R2 and R7 on the implications of 
epigenetics involve the reworking and interconnection of well-established scientific hopes and 
ethical concerns. 
 
R4 also flagged a matter that resonates with longstanding concerns within and beyond the 
academy. Specifically, they spoke of ‘developmental programming’, whereby epigenetic processes 
in foetuses and neonates impact future health: 
 
I think probably specifically the transgenerational thing [i.e. the possibility of inter-generational 
transmission of epigenetic marks] which is quite distinct and the, kind of, what you can also call 
developmental programming. So this means that things that have happened early in your life have an 
impact much later in your life. And whether it’s things that you’ve been given in nutrition during 
pregnancy, or scary things that happened in your early childhood. All this kind of stuff. So I think those are 
dimensions that are outside of genetics, at least in my perception I would say.  
  
Despite being “outside of genetics”, such matters nevertheless resonate with wider scientific, 
policy, and health and social care practice-orientated concerns around the promotion of 
biopsychosocial flourishing in the early years of life, including the prenatal months (Gillies et al, 
2016). Hence, while epigenetics research might indeed be “producing new versions of 
vulnerable, plastic life that require protection” (Mansfield, 2017: 355), such vulnerabilities – and 
related ethical dilemmas about what to do about them – are well-rehearsed. In a biomedical and 
cultural context in which statements like “things that have happened early in your life have an 
impact much later in your life” form a common trope, the reflections of R4 are recognisable if 
not necessarily derivative. My point is that the issues raised by R4 do not appear to be indexical 
to this scientist’s specific research; instead, they are somewhat more general concerns raised in 
other contexts. Again, this is suggestive of the extent to which the implications of epigenetics are 
choreographed through rearranging components of pre-existing epistemic and normative 
projects. 
 
To summarise, the ethical novelty of epigenetics was not taken for granted by the scientists I 
interviewed; rather, it was largely assembled through the sociological interview through prompts 
and following initial reflection. This novelty work entailed making links to debates and dialogues 
associated with other areas of bioscience, especially genetics. By making links to something old 
(namely, pre-existing science and/or ethical tropes), something new (i.e., the ethical implications 
of epigenetic research) could be built. Scientists’ talk about the wider ramifications of their work 




Ideas about epigenetics are beginning to inform social practices in a range of societies 
(Niewöhner et al, 2011; Warin et al, 2020). In relation to reproduction, for instance, epigenetic 
discourses have contributed to processes of responsiblisation (Pentecost, 2018; Richardson, 
2015; Valdez, 2018). The various societal ramifications of epigenetics relate, in part, to the 
purported novelty of epigenetic knowledge. Rather than contributing directly to the literature on 
the social impacts of epigenetics, this article has examined how the novelty of epigenetics can be 
socially produced and negotiated. I suggest that this attention to novelty per se could have wider 
relevance to sociological scholarship.  
 
To recap my findings and argument: first, I noted the definitional pluralism of ‘epigenetics’, 
arguing that this serves to produce and proliferate ascriptions of novelty (although I am mindful 
not to reduce definitional pluralism in general to being only or necessarily related to novelty). In 
the case of epigenetics, problematising the definition of the field helps to (re)present it as an 
important, new area of research that requires close characterisation. I suggest that any requirement 
is an achievement of definitional debate, rather than necessarily preceding it (cf. Law, 1999; Mol, 
1999). Subsequently, I examined how the novelty of epigenetics is synthesised in scientific texts 
and talk through its juxtaposition with genetics. The latter is often presented in such discourse as 
having epistemological limits that epigenetics might address. Epigenetics is thereby configured as 
new and vital, partly through the innovation it could enable. I then showed that the notion of 
epigenetics as having innovative potential was apparent within my interviews and in the 
biomedical literature. I linked notions of epigenetic innovation to excitement and intrigue, 
suggesting that the idea that epigenetics was new or might facilitate new developments was – in 
the emotional cultures of science – an accelerant of excitement. In turn, a position that 
epigenetics was exciting legitimates constructions of epigenetics as novel. Finally, I interrogated 
if and how epigenetics was configured as raising novel ethical issues. I showed how these were 
not taken for granted by scientists, and hence that the new can be deconstructed as well as 
assembled. Upon interview probes, my respondents occasionally articulated some ethical 
implications of epigenetics. Accounts often involved discursive links to pre-exiting debates or 
concerns (e.g. around risk and insurance) that provide an example of novelty work in the real-
time of conversation: namely, the enrolment of something old to create something new. In sum, 
novelty is a discursive achievement that can be undone as well as assembled; it is negotiable, not 
quintessence.   
 
An appreciation of the extent to which novelty is a social accomplishment has, I think, some 
implications for future sociological engagements with epigenetics. Within bioethics, Huang and 
King (2018: 77) have raised “caution against the temptation to claim that new research findings 
or technologies might unilaterally necessitate changes in ethical theory or policy 
recommendations”. Likewise, science studies scholar Sara Green (2016: 84) has highlighted the 
risk of a “non-critical endorsement” of “breaking news about biological complexity”. Similarly, I 
tentatively suggest the need for hesitation in relation to any sociological embrace of epigenetics 
as a catalyst for redirecting social science and theory. Within sociological discourse, suggestions 
are beginning to be made that sociologists should intertwine epigenetic knowledge into 
conceptualisations about the ontologies of social practices. These are undergirded by assertions 
that epigenetics is new, exciting, and/or important. My point it not to dismiss knowledge-claims 
emanating from epigenetics, or to dissuade colleagues from biosocial theorisation. It is, rather, to 
emphasise that social scientific characterisations of a field as novel and important might be part 
of the machinery by which it becomes more widely regarded as such. Given aforementioned 
concerns about the implications of epigenetics for processes of, for instance, responsibilisation, 
there are reasons to be cautious about sociological contributions to novelty work in biomedicine 
and beyond. 
 
The sociological analysis of novelty has the potential to make a wider contribution than solely to 
examinations of technoscientific innovation. Sociologists could inflect their work in ‘new’ ways 
through attention to how the actors and institutions they study negotiate different kinds of 
novelty. For instance, established debates about the construction of social problems and claims-
making, and more recent conversations around post-humanism and new materialisms, might 
afford some benefits through a direct focus on the novel. Discourses, practices, and entities are 
positioned as novel in a range of spheres, and attention to the material and semiotic work that 
goes into this can provide a further window into how action is enjoined or inertia maintained, 
generating a variety of insights into the questions of order, power, and meaning that energise 
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1 As a consequence of the visibility of my respondents within epigenetics, and following 
discussions about confidentiality in the interviews, this paper provides a level of anonymity 
which necessitates occlusions that could be dissatisfying to some readers. I give, for instance, few 
details about specific fields of research. These particularities, however, of course informed how I 
approached and treated the data – even though they might unfortunately be absent from the 
paper itself.  
2 In all quotes the italicised emphasis is in the original talk.  
3 In my answer I acknowledged the diversity of definitions and noted that part of the interview 
would seek to elucidate what he himself regarded as ‘epigenetics’. 
4 Notably, R5 slipped between descriptive and normative ascriptions of excitement in others: his 
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